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Abstract 
 
Economic, social and natural environmental systems are interdependent, and economic systems 
cannot be assessed in isolation from an interconnected whole.  Many parts of Asia face 
increasing market intrusion and forced changes in economic mechanisms and rights without 
concomitant social and technological co-evolution.  Consequently, serious problems for 
economic, social and environmental sustainability are being experienced by local communities, 
especially in remote regions and in peripheral areas such as Northeast India and in hilly regions 
of China.  Rapid Asian economic growth, extension of markets and processes of globalization 
are generating social tensions and magnifying stresses on natural environments.  Many 
subsistence and semi-subsistence communities have been suddenly confronted by the extension 
of markets and the backwash of globalization.  This has promoted uneven development, loss of 
community, disintegration of social structures which have supported economic mutualism and 
which have provided social safety nets.  In many cases too, natural resource bases and 
environments on which local communities depend for their livelihood are under threat, partly 
because systems of property rights and governance evolve slowly and externally imposed 
changes in these are often counterproductive.  This is illustrated by examples from Northeast 
India and China involving slash-and-burn agriculture.  Factors which may cause regional and 
social economic divergence in Asia in this globalizing world are discussed.  These include 
differential access to global knowledge and communication networks.  Urban and cosmopolitan 
communities probably stand to gain most from globalization processes. 
 
1. Introduction 
The evolution of holistic systems (such as those involving the social, economic, 
technological and environmental spheres) is complex.  If there is a great disparity in the rate of 
change of the subsystems (for example, if economic or technological change outpaces social or 
institutional development), this can result in disaster for societies and the natural environment.  
For instance, rapid expansion in the demand for natural resources (due to increased market 
access and globalization) can result in their inappropriate exhaustion if they remain open-access 
property.  Or the speedy introduction of new technologies which considerably lower the costs of 
exploiting such resources can have a similar effect.  Disastrous consequences are also possible in 
other cases, e.g., where communal rules apply but they have not had time to evolve to fit the new 
circumstance.  Even in the case of private property, new technologies can threaten sustainability 
if they engender large unfavourable externalities and policy measures are not adopted quickly to 
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control these externalities. 
Socio-economic structures undergo continual variation often at differential rates in 
different communities.  Consequently, we find communities in varied stages of socio-economic 
development and transition from one socio-economic system to another.  In the economic 
development process, communities may pass through a number of phases characterised by the 
following:  
(1) Hunting and gathering. 
(2) Shifting agriculture. 
(3) Settled agriculture. 
(4) Settled agriculture combined with urbanised and industrial societies, mostly 
market-based. 
(5) As in (4), but information-intensive economies dominated by tertiary industries 
and heavily dependent on market systems of a global nature.   
While hunter-and-gatherer communities are now very rare in Asia, communities of the above 
type are all present in Asia, sometimes even within the one country as in India or in China. 
Asia has rapidly become enmeshed in the global economy and there are pressures on it to 
extend its involvement in the globalization process and to increase its use of market systems even 
further than at present (e.g., through APEC, the structural adjustment policies advocated by the 
IMF and the World Bank).  Such rapid change is generating social turbulence especially in 
remote communities ‘low’ on the socio-economic development ladder.  Increasing market 
intrusion and exogenously imposed alterations in economic mechanisms and rights without 
concomitant social and technological evolution can create serious problems for economic, social 
and environmental sustainability of local communities in remote or peripheral regions such as in 
Northeast India or in some mountainous parts of China, e.g., Yunnan.  This is especially so for 
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those agricultural communities which still depend heavily on slash-and-burn agriculture. 
This article first of all considers in relation to Asia, economic sustainability and related 
aspects of sustainability in the light of the endogenous innovation hypothesis of Scherr and 
Hazell (1994).  Scherr and Hazell take a relatively optimistic view of the prospects for 
sustainable agricultural development on fragile lands when either increased population densities 
or extensions of markets (which increase market demand) occur.  This is discussed generally in 
the Asian context and then with particular reference to the Mizos in Northeast India and to the 
Jingpo in Southwest China.  Then follows  a general discussion of the consequences of rural 
communities of extension of markets and globalization, giving particular attention to its impacts 
on income levels and the distribution of income, security, stability of incomes and their 
sustainability.  In conclusion some policy implications are highlighted. 
2. The Agricultural Sustainability Hypothesis of Scherr and Hazell 
Scherr and Hazell (1994) are relatively optimistic about the prospects for sustainable 
agricultural development on marginal or fragile lands.  They believe that while increasing 
population densities and rising market demand may initially result in resource degradation, this 
process eventually induces agricultural innovation and investment in land improvement.  
Consequently, although the total supply of services and products available from natural resources 
in land may decline at first, subsequently, it rises and is likely to exceed eventually its initial 
level.  Their typical pattern of agricultural development/natural resource-use is indicated by the 
curve marked I in Figure 1.  They divide this pattern into the four phases indicated in Figure 1: 
A - Dependence on naturally-occurring resources (e.g., natural woodlands; 
management of natural vegetation). 
B - Resource degradation (e.g. deforestation). 
C - Resource rehabilitation and transition to intensive management (e.g., tree planing 
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on farms, regulation of communal woodlands). 
D - Dependence on human-managed resources (e.g., agroforestry, forest plantations, 
managed reserves). 
While Scherr and Hazell believe that the pattern of natural resources development 
indicated in Figure 1 is most common, they do not dismiss other possibilities.  In some cases, the 
induced recovery phase (C) may be later than expected or it could even fail to materialize at all, 
if for example, there were serious impediments to the creation of private property rights in land. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There may,  in addition, be other circumstances in which recovery from land degradation 
can fail to occur.  For example, land degradation may proceed so far that no surplus is available 
to the local community to invest in natural resource enhancement or the returns to such 
enhancement after severe land degradation may be very low or even negative.  In these 
circumstances, population density in the marginal agricultural region may be controlled by 
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Malthusian factors or by out-migration,  or both.  Again, it is possible that induced innovation 
may not eventuate because the choice of innovations is extremely limited due to lack of research 
and alternative technologies for the marginal area involved.  While induced innovation may not 
happen because of the ignorance of  local communities, this is not the only reason for the 
absence of the response predicted by Scherr and Hazell. 
Failure of property rights to evolve in a manner which permits private investment or 
innovation to be profitable, can also impede natural resource recovery.  Where shifting 
agriculture is practised and plots of land are communally reallocated each time a shift is made, 
individuals have little or no incentive to invest in land improvements since they are unlikely to 
be the beneficiaries of such investment.  They can be expected to take a short-term perspective in 
exploiting land.  This is so even though the land is communal property rather than open-access 
property. 
North (1981; 1990), Demsetz (1968), Feder (1987), Feder and Feeney (1991) and others 
suggest that with increased demand for the produce of land (other things equal) ownership of  
land evolves towards private property.  While this seems to be so, it may only happen slowly and 
over a long-period of time and with considerable social conflict.  Very rapid or shock penetration 
of market systems into local communities with limited pre-existing market systems can 
precipitate severe resource degradation from which recovery is impossible, lead to much income 
inequality and poverty in local communities and block induced innovation of the type envisaged 
by Scherr and Hazell. 
The speed and nature of change, as well as its direction are important.  It is all very well 
to extol market systems on the basis of the reputed qualities in equilibrium, but from the point of 
view of human welfare and policy, the transition should not be ignored, not only because the 
nature of transition has important social consequences in itself, but is likely to influence future 
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‘resting points’ because of path-dependence. 
While very rapid exposure of a local community to markets and globalizing processes 
may prevent the community from following a desirable development path, extremely gradualistic 
change might have a similar impact.  This may occur because such change does not evoke 
sufficient challenges to the community at any point to generate adjustment responses which 
induce appropriate types of institutional change or investment in land improvements.   A 
response is more likely to be evoked by discontinuous but not overwhelming variation.  This 
may enhance community perception of the presence of changei, may temporarily cause outcomes 
to fall below aspiration levels and therefore induce search behaviour both for new institutions 
and for new technologiesii. 
The above suggests that neoclassical economists who mostly rely on equilibrium models 
are in a poor position to provide policy-advice about the best methods of transition of non-market 
economies to market economies.  Their ‘big-bang’ policy recommendation is crude and 
inappropriate and shows a failure to study paths of transition.  Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
extremely gradualistic exposure of a community to markets and globalizing forces would not 
yield the best results either.  Greater study of such issues involving co-evolution is needed. 
Returning to the Scherr and Hazell model, the way in which they specify the total supply 
of services and products from a given natural resource calls for comment.  This is because it is 
unclear how in fact they specify it.  This is a serious problem for their model (Figure 1).  
Furthermore, even the increase in their market-demand variable may be difficult to specify 
because with the expansion of markets, the demand for some commodities usually increases and 
that for others declines. 
Certainly stage D of the process envisaged by Scherr and Hazell (Figure 1) may involve 
retention of few of the original natural resources of an area and the process may exhibit a 
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considerable reduction in biodiversity compared to stage A.  Nevertheless, in stage D there could 
be more tree-cover than in stage A, e.g., irrigated fruit trees on previous desert land.  However, 
in this case there has been considerable substitution of produced capital for natural capital. While 
this may improve a local environment from a human perspective, on a macro-scale such 
substitution may be problematical from a sustainability point of view. 
3. Experiences of the Tribal People in Northeast India and Jingpo in China 
A number of tribal people in India and some in China, such as the Jingpo, practise slash-
and-burn agriculture.  It is estimated that worldwide about 300-500 million people engage in this 
type of agriculture.  Over recent centuries, slash-and-burn agriculture disappeared in many 
countries as market economies developed within them.  In these cases, either transition to settled 
agriculture has occurred or previously farmed marginal areas have been abandoned to become 
wasteland and/or allowed to revert to forest or scrub.  This has been a common pattern in Europe. 
 Such changes in Europe were accompanied by outward rural migration to urban centres and 
migration to overseas countries colonized by Europeans.  These variations occurred over several 
 centuries, whereas in Asia, the pressure for change in slash-and-burn communities on marginal 
land appears to have been telescoped into a few decades. 
Here I shall concentrate on the experiences of the Mizos of Mizoram in Northeast India 
and the Jingpo,  mostly located in Dehong Prefecture in Yunnan.  Both practise slash-and-burn 
agriculture.  
The Mizos (the dominant group in Mizoram) are located mainly in the northern section of 
Mizoram.  Mizoram itself forms a wedge between Bangladesh and Mynamar.  The Chackmas are 
located in the south of Mizoram and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and also 
practise shifting agriculture.  The Chackmas appear to be under political pressure for control of 
their resources both from the Mizos and the Bangladeshis.  Mizoram is mountainous and deeply 
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dissected by rivers or streams and transportation is difficult.  Its soils are of low productivity, and 
its terrain makes access to markets difficult. 
The population of Mizoram has increased rapidly (its exponential growth rate in the 
period 1981-91 was 3.34%) and with improved road transport and some growth in urbanisation 
in Mizoram market possibilities for agricultural produce have increased, as well as the range of 
products (e.g., radios, musical players) available for purchase.  The latter (increased range of 
manufactures) has most likely raised income aspirations.  The consequence is that fallow periods 
for land subject to slash-and-burn have become shorter, often as short as 4-5 years.  This has 
several consequences: 
(1) Annual yields on cultivated land have fallen because the length of the fallow-
period has shortened making fallow less adequate to regenerate the fertility of the 
soiliii.  While falling annual yields per cultivated hectare can be compatible with 
rising total agricultural output, a point can be reached where total agricultural 
output declines due to the shortening fallow-periodsiv. 
(2) Reduced fallow-periods means that the same land is more frequently subject to 
soil disturbance and increasingly subject to erosion.  This reduces the fertility of 
the soil at a site and in the long-term may reduce soil-depth to such a low level 
that an area can no longer be cultivated. 
(3) In Mizoram, and elsewhere, at the same time as the fallow-period falls, the area 
under cultivation rises so adding to offsite adverse externalities from soil erosion 
and altered hydrological balance. 
(4) Landscapes alter and biodiversity loss accelerates due to some extent to extension 
 of cultivation but mainly because the fallow-period is reduced and vegetation is 
unable to complete its previous biological succession of species. 
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In situations where the fallow-period is short, settled agriculture might offer better 
income and sustainability prospects if combined with conservation practice such as hedgerow 
and alley-cropping,  agroforestry or the growing of fruit trees.  Present systems of property rights 
often make transition to such agriculture impossible.  Mizos shift from one area of cultivation to 
another as a village group each year.  Land in each new cultivation area is allocated to families 
by means of a ballot.  Hence, no family has permanent rights in any area of land and therefore no 
incentive to invest in the long-term conservation of land, or to plant perennials which would 
yield benefits beyond the period set aside for cultivation of an area by the village. 
Systems of property of rights in Mizoram are altering slowly.  Village councils appear to 
be reluctant to change the system of rights.  Most of Mizoram seems to be trapped in phase B 
(the resource degradation phase) in the model of Scherr and Hazell (Figure 1).  Population 
increase has not yet resulted in transition to more sustainable phases of agricultural development, 
and there is a risk of further land degradation occurring without recovery as cultivation cycles 
involved in slash-and-burn are reduced.  Nevertheless, the institutional situation is not entirely 
staticv,vi. 
Around the capital of Mizoram, Aizawl, de facto private property rights in land are not 
uncommon because of the proximity of this land to the Aizawl market (Nath, personal 
communication, September, 1995).  This land is often cultivated by day-workers trucked from 
Aizawl.  This pattern of property rights is consistent with economic theories of property rights 
(Demsetz, 1968; North, 1981, 1990).  Nevertheless, in remote areas and still in most of Mizoram, 
‘traditional’ property rights in land remain, probably because opportunities for marketing farm 
produce are limited and insufficient to overcome social barriers to altering property rights. 
The Government of Mizoram has introduced a New Land Use Policy (NLUP) in order to 
reduce shifting agriculture in Mizoram and to encourage forms of settled land use.  The policies 
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adopted are along the lines recommended by the (Indian) National Commission for 
Agriculturevii.  The clearing of forested land is prohibited in selected blocks and subsidies are 
provided for alternative employment in settled agriculture, animal husbandry and village trades, 
such as carpentry. 
According to Lianzela (1995, p. 61), ‘Selection of beneficiaries of NLUP has been done 
on the basis of household surveys conducted in villages covered by the programme.  In the 
guidelines, precautionary measures are to be taken in respect of household selection and 
utilisation of funds.  As the programme chiefly aims at lifting the rural poor, first priority is 
accorded to jhumia families [slash-and-burn agriculture in this part of India is called jhum] in the 
selection of beneficiaries.  Households who are partly dependant on jhum cultivation are given 
second priority’. 
In 1993-94, just over three-quarters of the subsidy (income supplements for participants 
in NLUP) was paid for agriculture and allied settled activities, a fifth for animal husbandry and 
less than five per cent for village-based occupations.  Each family participating in NLUP is 
provided with a small area of land (about 2 hectares)viii and is provided with an income 
supplement by instalments for three years.  Land-uses and development plans are prescribed.  
Apart from a main occupation, e.g., wet rice cultivation, each family is allowed to engage in a 
subsidiary activity, e.g., the husbandry of pigs.  Participants are therefore ‘guided’ by 
Government authorities. 
Such authorities do not always offer economic options to participants in NLUP.  For 
example, many families were encouraged to grow pineapples under NLUP only to find that there 
was an inadequate market for them.  In political protest, they left the pineapples on roads so that 
vehicles would drive over them. Also one can question whether the emphasis on wet rice 
production with the aim of Mizoram achieving self-sufficiency in rice production is justified.  
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Mizoram does not appear to have a comparative advantage in wet rice production.  The goal of 
self-sufficiency on a statewide basis in India may make little economic sense, as in China. 
Both the market prospects and the initial cash-flow difficulties can be a problem for those 
who give up slash-and-burn for settled agriculture.  Nevertheless, even in the case of a switch to 
horticulture (tree crops), it is not an insuperable problem.  In the village of Sesawng, I met in late 
1995 with the village president and his wife, who had taken up land under NLUP to grow fruit 
trees.  They had a mixed stand of bananas, jackfruit and mangoes.  The latter had been 
intercropped with bananas which bear quickly and give an early cash return.  Fruit from the other 
trees will follow on.  They said that buyers (middlemen) came from Aizawl to purchase their 
bananas.  They were pleased with the development of their enterprise and intended to develop 
the plot of the president’s brother-in-law in a similar way. 
The importance of market access is recognised under NLUP.  Lianzela reports (1995, p. 
62) that ‘provision is made under the NLUP scheme for construction of motorable roads linking 
the areas where various trades under agriculture sectors are implemented by the beneficiaries in a 
compact area for the transportation of their product’.  Nevertheless, Lianzela (1995, pp. 62-63) 
remains sceptical about the NLUP programme because of political interference and shortcomings 
in supervision and monitoring which provide scope for dishonesty and non-compliance.  
Furthermore, only a few miles of road have been constructed under NLUP. 
On the whole this transitional scheme seems to be gradualistic rather than a big-bang one. 
 By the end of 1994 over 40,000 hectares of land was subject to NLUP assuming that each family 
involved (see Lianzela, 1995, p. 60) has 1-2 hectares in the scheme.  Artificial fertilisers and 
improved seed varieties are being increasingly used in Mizoram and settled agriculture is 
becoming more common.  Nevertheless, jhumming was still being widely practised in 1995 
when I visited Mizoram.  The fallow-period had been reduced to 4-5 years making jhumming a 
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relatively unproductive form of land-use. 
The agricultural practices of the Jingpo in China (and to some extent their experiences) 
are not unlike those of the Mizos.  The Jingpo are mostly located in China in Dehong Prefecture 
in Yunnan near the Burmese border, with considerable numbers also being present in Mynamar.  
They have practised slash-and-burn cultivation in Dehong Prefecture for about six centuries, and 
probably migrated there from a Tibetan plateau (Yin, 1993).  The Jingpo cultivate their land only 
for one year then shift to another woodland area that has been slashed-and-burnt to cultivate it 
for one year.  Traditionally the land used to be left fallow for 11-12 years but now this has been 
reduced to 7-8 years because of increased population and because some of the forested land 
formerly used by the Jingpo has been put under the control of the Ministry of Forestry for timber 
extraction and for nature reserves.  Mizo villagers in India also lost land in a similar way. 
The Jingpos rotational agricultural system of slash-and-burn used to be quite economic 
and sustainable.  Now, however, shorter fallow-periods are making it less economic.  Zhuge and 
Tisdell (1996) suggest that a new system should be developed to substitute for the old one, but 
good aspects of the existing system should be retained.   
Changing property rights have affected the agricultural system of the Jingpo in China.  In 
the early 1950s, the Government of the People’s Republic of China nationalised almost all lands, 
minerals and forests in China.  It (1) took over the state lands and forests of  the previous  
government, and (2) nationalised virgin soil and forests and private forests if they were over 500 
mu, about 33.3 hectares.  Small, broken and scattered lands and forests and forests of landlords 
were allocated to local communities (Zhuge and Tisdell, 1996). 
Thus, legally only very small areas of forested land remained under the control of local 
communities.  It therefore became impossible for the Jingpos to legally continue with their past 
agricultural practices and they entered the twilight zone of illegality in continuing with these.  
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There were sharp conflicts between the Jingpos and the state authorities with some concessions 
being made to the Jingpos.  Nevertheless, conflict is still present because the Jingpos have 
insufficient arable land and forest land for slash-and-burn agriculture.  Because of uncertainty of 
property rights and other factors, deforestation in Dehong Prefecture has been severe (Zhuge and 
Tisdell, 1996, p. 15). 
Zhuge and Tisdell (1996, p. 15) state that, ‘Adequate land and forest tenures are at the 
core of community development in the Jingpo areas.  The development of the Jingpo community 
should stress the  conscious participation of the local people in the use of such resources.  Clearer 
property rights in land and forest resources and rights or manage these will motivate local 
communities and villages to take better care of these resources.  The present policy of land 
leasing gives a good beginning for reducing conflicts.  According to the new land policy of the 
‘Transfer of Four Types of Wastes on Lease’, the wastelands, barren mountains, flood lands and 
unused water resources, whether state owned or belonging to the collective will be shifted to 
individual households on lease.  That can at least address the claims of the local people partly’. 
In the case of the Jingpo, changes in their social institutions and property rights were not 
gradualistic or evolutionary, but quite sudden as a result of state dogma.  The consequence was 
considerable social conflict and environmental destruction.  Only since China’s economic 
reforms have the problems involved in the shifting agriculture of the Jingpo and their property 
rights started to be addressed more realistically.  Undoubtedly the imposition of state property 
rights (as was done by the British in India and enthusiastically continued by the Government of 
(independent) India, and also done by the Government of The  People’s Republic of China) has 
caused serious socio-economic disturbance to many local communities (often consisting of tribal 
or minority peoples), who depend on forests for their livelihood (Tisdell and Roy, 1997),  as in 
the case of slash-and-burn cultivators.  While such local communities might have eventually 
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reached a socio-economic crisis in the absence of external intervention, they might have at least 
had their own governance to deal with it.  Past interference from external forces has in many 
cases, magnified the socio-economic difficulties of local communities.  The absence of 
endogenous co-evolution (self-determination) may have added to environmental problems.  The 
question still remains open of whether and when these local communities will reach the blissful 
stage D of the Scherr and Hazell model of sustainable agricultural development. 
4. General Comments on Markets and Globalization and Rural Communities – 
Income Levels, Security, Distribution and Sustainability 
According to proponents of neoclassical economic theory, extension of markets and 
globalization will increase economic welfare, in terms of a potential Paretian improvement.  At 
the same time, however, these processes are likely to alter the distribution of income, the balance 
of political power and safety nets for social security.  However, neoclassical economic theory is 
essentially static in nature.  Dynamic theories of markets and economic growth (including some 
evolutionary modes) are less prescriptive but probably lean on balance to the view that extension 
of markets and globalization are likely to raise incomes.  The matter is complex.  If globalization 
results in less diversity of business organizations, then in the long-run, less economic growth 
may occur than would have been the case with greater diversity (Tisdell, 1996).  Again, there is a 
danger that as firms become larger as a result of globalization, they will lose their incentive and 
innovative capacity due to bureaucratisation; a problem which Schumpeter (1942) foresaw. 
In relation to agriculture, farmers are often forced to specialise as a result of market 
forces, and to use techniques that are not sustainable (Tisdell, 1993a, Ch. 11).  This makes their 
livelihood relatively insecure because market prices can be subject to considerable variation.  
Regional and person income inequality may increase particularly in the early stages of economic 
growth when supported by the extension of market and globalisation (Cf. Tisdell, 1993b, Chs 5 
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and 6). 
In Asian countries (and elsewhere) ethnic groups and other groups which have 
widespread networks and knowledge of markets beyond their community are likely to gain most 
initially by extension of markets.  Usually these are not tribal groups or rural minorities, but 
members of dominant ethnic groups.  In Jingpo areas in China, for example, it may well be the 
Han group located amongst the Jingpo are in the best position to gain initially from extension of 
market opportunities.  They are in a good position to act as middlemen, and also take advantage 
of tourism development which requires a degree of cosmopolitanism.   The Han may possess 
greater guangxi, connections.   The same may well be true in Northeast Indiaix.  Furthermore, 
urban areas and urban-dwellers often stand to gain most from market extension (Tisdell, 1997).  
Rents can be earned by access to market knowledge and contacts especially in early stages of 
market extension and globalisation and this affects the distribution of income. 
Many communities in Asia have not been able to evolve endogenously.  Apart from 
government intervention, ethnic groups in several areas have experiences immigration  of other 
groups and this has not infrequently been a source of social conflict.  For example, over a period 
of time Bengalis have migrated to the Barind Tract and other parts of North-West Bangladesh to 
compete with the Santals (a local tribal group) for the use of land and other rural resources.  The 
Bengalis have brought with them more intensive forms of agriculture and severe deforestation 
and loss of natural vegetation cover has occurred over a period of a 100 years or so.  About 100 
years ago, N.W. Bangladesh had about 50 per cent natural vegetation cover and was fairly well 
wooded, but today it has virtually no forest cover (Zuberi, 1992).  Similarly, Bengalis have 
migrated into the Chittagong Hill Tracts and commenced settled agriculture in competition for 
land with the Chackmas.  This migration has resulted in severe soil erosion because Bengali 
agricultural practices, well suited to the plains,  have not been adapted to the hills.  In such cases, 
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co-evolution has been circumvented. 
5. Concluding Comments 
Market extensions and globalization are creating pressures for socio-economic change in 
agricultural communities on marginal lands in Asia.  Traditional systems heavily reliant on social 
exchange and obligation combined with a high degree of economic self-sufficiency of 
communities and communal approaches to productive activities, as in the case of shifting 
agriculture, are under pressure (Ramakrishnan, 1992).  Even without such pressures, these 
communities may well have reached a stage where old practices were no longer sustainable.  
Because of intrusions from outside of local communities, such communities have reached crisis 
situations earlier than otherwise, e.g., due to expropriation of at least some of their forest 
resources.  Furthermore, rapid market contacts are changing the production patterns of such 
communities as their income aspirations are raised.  This is associated with a desire to earn cash 
to obtain items such as consumer durables, and willingness to engage in unsustainable 
agriculture practices to increase cash flow, e.g., the growing of maize on steep slopes in 
Xishuangbanna in China, increased cultivation of monocultures, and loss of local crop varieties.  
While it is unrealistic to believe that marginal rural communities, of the type mentioned above, 
can be insulated from global change, their precarious socio-economic position and their 
transitional problems require more attention by policy-makers and the international community.  
At present most consideration seems to be given to communities which are non-marginal and in 
the centre of economic development in Asia.  Those rural communities on periphery, often 
depending on rainfed agriculture and not belonging to the mainstream cultures, as in the case of 
various tribal peoples, appear to be relatively neglected. 
Peripheral rural communities in Asia and their transitional problems should be given 
more attention because: 
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– such communities are often in poverty; 
– lack environmental sustainability; 
– are often (not surprisingly) a source of political insurgency; 
– have a rich and relatively unique cultural heritage; 
– often possess valuable local knowledge, and 
– their areas frequently contain considerable diversity of biological resources. 
However, to ensure more attention to these communities is difficult because national 
governments are usually controlled by individuals belonging to dominant ethnic groups and the 
mainstream culture.  As a result, they may have little interest in peripheral communities per se, 
scant appreciation of their problems and in some cases, may even be prejudiced against them. 
 
Notes 
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i. Otherwise the change may be so slow as to be subliminal.  
ii. This supposes adaptive behaviour similar to that presumed in some psychological 
theories of behaviour. 
iii. Ramakrishnan (1992) suggests that this happens when the cultivation cycle is reduced 
below 10-12 years. 
iv. For example, if the fallow-period is reduced by half and yield per cultivated hectare falls 
                                                                                                                                                         
by less than half,  total agricultural output from land (cropped plus fallow) will rise.  In 
this case, the area of cropped land doubles and total agricultural output rises if yield per 
hectare less than halves.  Total agricultural output is maximised when the proportionate 
increase in cropped area equals the proportional reduction (due to shorter fallow-period) 
in agricultural yield per hectare being cropped.  This determines the optimal fallow-
period from the above point of view.  For instance, if the total area subject to cropping 
and fallow is A hectares, and if the above conditions is satisfied, when B hectares are 
cropped, B
B-A
 is the optimal fallow-period in years given that cropping occurs for only 
one year. 
 
The above assumes that the production function does not drift downward with the 
passage of time.  It may do so, and be more inclined to do this the shorter is the fallow-
period.  Thus shorter fallow-periods may be associated with less sustainability of 
traditional slash-and-burn agriculture. 
v. While village allocation of land for slash-and-burn agriculture in Mizoram has been 
traditional, significant changes have been made in the rights involved since the 
independence of India.  In 1954, the Union Government abolished chieftainships in 
Mizoram and thereby the unequal distribution of land.  To do this, it passed the Assam 
Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Right) Act 1954 and installed 
democratically elected village councils.  Since then ‘the allocation of land is made by 
those elected village councils through the draw of lots.  Under this system every citizen 
has had equal chance to getting a piece of land without being discriminated [against].  
Allotment is now fully based on the draw of lots. 
 
A strict regulation is made by the village council that the allotment of land for jhumming 
is meant for the actual resident cultivators of the village.  The size of the land holding is 
decided on the basis of family size’ (Lianzela, 1994, p. 133).  To some extent, the current 
property rights system is imposed by the central government of India. 
vi. The power of the state, at least in legislative terms, is somewhat overwhelming in 
Mizoram.  ‘Land ownership is statutorily vested in the government and the government, 
in turn formulates laws by which it will govern different types of ownership within the 
state’ (Lianzela, 1994, p. 194).  Such a situation is not without its dangers and parallels to 
some extent the situation in China as far as the Jingpo are concerned.  In general, the 
state has undermined communal control of resources and the socio-economic 
consequences are frequently adverse (Tisdell and Roy, 1997). 
vii. This may once again reflect the dominance of the central Indian government as compared 
to local government. 
viii. Their rights in this land have yet to be clarified fully.  Lianzela (1995, p. 135) states: 
‘Under NLUP, land will be temporarily allotted to the selected families by the village 
council at the size of the two hectares per family.  These selected families will be issued 
[with a] Land Settlement Certificate (LSC) later on, on a merit basis (how they actually 
use the land allotted to them temporarily) by the Village Council Court.  In this way, on a 
more permanent basis, land will be allotted to the selected people’.  At this stage, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
rights of those allotted land to assign it or sell it have not been clarified but it is possible 
that these will be restricted, e.g., to family or village members if the land is assignable. 
ix. This needs more investigation.  Who are the middlemen who come to buy fruit and 
produce from the villagers?  In relation to Sesawng village, the village president and his 
wife had spent some time in Aizawl before returning to Sesawng, so presumably had 
increased their networks and knowledge about economic opportunities while there. 
